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"AGREEING TO DISAGREE":
FILLING GAPS IN DELIBERATELY INCOMPLETE
CONTRACTS

OMRI BEN-SHAHAR*

INTRODUCTION

Incomplete contracts have always been viewed as raising the
following challenge for contract law: does the incompleteness-or,
"indefiniteness," as it is usually called-rise to such a level that renders
the agreement legally unenforceable? When the indefiniteness concerns
important terms, it is presumed that the parties have not reached an
agreement to which they intend to be bound. This "fundamental policy"
is the upshot of the view that "contracts should be made by the parties,
not by the courts."' When, in contrast, the indefiniteness concerns less
important terms, courts supplement the agreement with gap fillers and
enforce the supplemented contract.
The common law has traditionally tended towards the no-contract
outcome. For example, an agreement to pay an employee "a fair share"
of the profits, without specifying the precise fraction, was too indefinite
to be enforced. 2 This traditional result has been weakened under the
Uniform Commercial Code's (the "Code") "contract with open terms"
approach that more aggressively supplements the parties' agreement
with reasonable or average terms, including price terms. 3
Many areas of contracting have witnessed significant shifts from the
common law's formalist no-contract outcome to the more liberal gap
filling and enforcement approach embodied in the Code. However, both
the traditional common law and the Code continue to share the premise
that the problem of indefiniteness is of a dichotomous nature: either a
full-blown contract can be assembled with the aid of gap fillers, or no
Regimes and
contract exists. These are the only two choices.
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1.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) cmt. b (1981).
2.

See, e.g., Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 823 (N.Y. 1916).

3.

U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2002).
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jurisdictions may differ as to where the boundary between contract and
no-contract lies, but they all follow the all-or-nothing methodology.
This Article proposes a different methodology. It advances the idea
that partial agreements may deserve partial enforcement. If a deal is
only partially struck, because it contains pockets of indefiniteness, the
law should not be limited to choosing the polar solutions of full
enforcement or no enforcement. Instead, the law should have available
an intermediate solution of holding the parties accountable only to the
definite parts of the agreement. The more definite the deal is, the
greater the contractual liability.
This Article identifies an important category of situations in which
parties intentionally drafted their agreement indefinite, leaving issues
that were difficult to resolve for future completion. In these situations,
contractual incompleteness is neither a result of haste nor of
unforeseeability, but rather a deliberate choice to temporarily disagree
over some matters, to sidestep difficult issues over which consensus
could not be reached. It is here, in the presence of partial assent, that
"partial enforcement" could be desirable.
In these setting of deliberate incompleteness, the familiar standards
of filling gaps, using either reasonable hypothetical consent
("mimicking" or "majoritarian" default rules), or information-forcing
one-sided provisions ("penalty" default rules), are not suitable for filling
gaps in such deliberately incomplete contracts. They are not suitable
because they provide definitive default terms, which prevent the parties
from leaving their deal legally binding and incomplete. That is, under
the familiar standards of gap filling, if parties recognize and anticipate
the content of the gap filler, then the set of legal obligations governing
the transaction-whether explicit or supplemented-is no longer
incomplete. Effectively then, in the presence of definitive default terms,
no additional assent is needed and the parties are deprived of the
power-which they may have sought to maintain-to affirmatively
approve or veto the missing terms.
Instead, this Article proposes a new approach to gap filling: a party
who seeks enforcement of a deliberately incomplete agreement would be
granted an option to enforce the transaction under the agreed-upon terms
supplemented with terms that are the most favorable (within reason) to
the defendant. I will call this gap-filling principle a "pro-defendant"
default rule. If a buyer and a seller agree on many provisions but leave
others, such as payment terms, "to be agreed upon," then each party
should be able to enforce a deal supplemented by payment terms that are
most favorable to the other party. The buyer should be able to enforce a
deal in which payment is made in cash, in full, upfront; and the seller
should be able to enforce a deal in which the buyer is granted the
generous credit terms that the buyer sought. The incomplete contract is
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supplemented by a "decoupled" default provision, either payment in
cash or lenient credit terms, depending on the identity of the enforcing
party. Effectively, a deliberately incomplete contract becomes the legal
equivalent of two complete contracts, each favorable to a different party,
with each party entitled to enforce only the contract favorable to its
opponent.
To understand the novelty of this gap-filling approach, compare its
prescription to those of other gap-filling approaches in a contract with a
missing price. For example, consider a landlord and a tenant who
agreed on the subject matter of the lease and all other terms, but left the
price term open. Imagine that the reasonable monthly rent for such
property varies from $3000 to $5000. Under the "mimicking" approach
to gap filling, the court ought to set a "fair and reasonable" price,
reflecting the rent in the majority of comparable leases, which is
somewhere between $3000 and $5000, perhaps $4000. Under the
"penalty" default-rule approach, the court might want to set the price
biased against the party who drafted the agreement (contraproferentem), to provide that party with incentives to draft the price
term explicitly. If it were the landlord who drafted the vague contract,
the supplemented price would be $3000. Under the pro-defendant gapfilling approach that is developed here, the price term would depend on
the party seeking enforcement. If the tenant is the party trying to
enforce the deal, then she can only do so at a price of $5000, most
favorable to the landlord. And if it is the landlord who is suing for
enforcement, then he can only get a price of $3000, most favorable to
the tenant.
Of course, the selection of a gap-filling standard should not be
arbitrary, but should depend on the reason for the incompleteness.
Thus, the mimicking gap filler should apply when the parties wanted to
save the cost of explicit agreement and intended to apply an average or
market term. The penalty gap filler should apply when one of the
parties-in the above example, the landlord-is responsible for the
vagueness and could have resolved it cheaply by making an explicit
stipulation. And, along the argument that will be developed in this
Article, the pro-defendant gap filler should apply when the parties failed
to reach consensus over this issue and left it deliberately indefinite.
Specifically, it should apply in the common scenario in which the parties
left this term "to be agreed upon," preserving mutual veto power.
This Article develops various justifications for the pro-defendant
gap-filling approach. First, it suggests that, on conceptual grounds, this
outcome reflects more precisely the intent of the parties who drafted a
deliberately indefinite agreement or an agreement-to-agree.
These
parties have reached some consensus, a partial commitment, and thus a
no-contract result would frustrate their achievement. But at the same
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time they failed to reach consent over the missing term, rendering false
the presumption of "hypothetical consent," which lies at the basis of the
mimicking default rule. Further, while it is reasonable for the defendant
to reject a court-imposed "compromise" term on the grounds that she
explicitly reserved her right to veto such compromises in the hope of
securing better-than-average terms, it would be unreasonable for the
defendant to reject a deal containing her most favorable terms. Surely,
when she entered the indefinite agreement, the best terms she must have
intended to secure are these "most favorable" terms (although she may
have soberly hoped to get terms that are less one-sided). What grounds
then, does the defendant now have to reject a deal that grants her such
terms? Such a one-sided deal, we can say for certain, is the one deal
that does not conflict with the enforced-against party's initial intent.
Although she reserved the veto power, it is not such favorable terms that
she intended to veto.
This Article suggests that the pro-defendant gap-filling approach
serves additional goals. First, it will be shown that this regime provides
negotiating parties with greater security against unilateral retractions by
their counterparts, thus enhancing the incentives to make precontractual
investments. This greater precontractual investment, in turn, increases
the overall contractual pie. Second, the binding nature of precontractual
agreements enables parties to break down the big commitment into
smaller piecemeal commitments accumulated sequentially. These two
effects increase the chances that negotiations will succeed and that full
agreement will eventually be achieved.
The proposed pro-defendant gap-filling approach is not merely a
theoretical possibility, but rather a viable technique recognized (and
occasionally applied) by courts adjudicating incomplete agreements.
Part IV of this Article will survey the variety of contexts in which courts
have considered pro-defendant gap fillers, and how courts managed to
identify the content of the defendant's most favorable term. To briefly
illustrate one such context, consider the case of Ontario Downs Co. v.
Lauppe, which involved an agreement for the sale of 16 acres of land
for $50,000, but left for further agreement where within the seller's
450-acre lot the land would lie. 4 When the seller retracted, the
negotiations were not yet resumed and the lot was never identified. In
the suit by the buyer, the court rejected the no-contract outcome but at
the same time refused to designate a reasonable parcel. Instead, the
court instructed that the contract can only be enforced with respect to a
parcel that seller would designate.
Effectively, the contract was
supplemented with a term-the parcel of land-most favorable to the
defendant.
4.

13 Cal. Rptr. 782, 782, 784, 786 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
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Similarly, there is a substantial line of cases in which the parties
left the payment terms open "to be agreed upon," where courts applied
the doctrine of "cure by concession" and allowed the buyer to enforce
the deal if she agrees to make a full payment in cash and with no delay,
namely, in a manner most favorable to the seller.' When the agreement
is supplemented in such a pro-defendant manner, "there is no longer any
way the provision may be construed to [the defendant's] detriment,"6
and thus it is guaranteed not to violate the defendant's original intent.
This Article develops the theory of pro-defendant gap fillers in four
parts. Part I briefly reviews the law of indefiniteness and the existing
theory of gap filling. Part II identifies situations in which contracts are
left deliberately incomplete and demonstrates that existing standards of
gap filling do not provide an adequate solution to these situations. Part
III develops the concept of pro-defendant default provisions, and argues
that they are suitable to fill gaps in deliberately incomplete contracts.
Finally, Part IV explores, as just explained, various doctrinal uses of the
pro-defendant gap-filling technique.
I.

INDEFINITE AGREEMENTS AND GAP FILLING

A.
1.

The Law of Gap Filling

THE PROBLEM OF INDEFINITENESS

A contract is indefinite when it does not address a material aspect
of the deal. Some seemingly unresolved aspects could be overcome by
courts through liberal interpretation of meaning or by reference to
context (e.g., prior oral agreements, course of performance). But other
unresolved aspects cannot because the parties simply failed to reach
agreement or to manifest any type of inferable assent over these matters.
These contracts suffer from indefiniteness.
Traditionally, the common law regarded indefinite contracts as
lacking mutual assent and unenforceable. The justification for this
policy was often stated in terms of an absence of the intent to be bound.
Because the underlying question is always whether the parties intended
to contract, the more issues left unresolved, the stronger is the inference

5.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 33 illus. 2 ("A
agrees to sell and B to buy a specific tract of land for $10,000 ...[and] to lend B the
amount, but the terms of loan are not stated .... The contract is too indefinite to

[enforce] against B,but B may [enforce it] if he offer to pay the full price in cash.").
6.

Busching v. Griffin, 542 So. 2d 860, 864 (Miss. 1989).

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
that no such intent ripened.7 Accordingly, if the missing terms were
sufficiently material, the contract would have been unenforceable.
This approach, often viewed as formalistic and harsh, was reformed
under the Code. Under the Code, indefiniteness-whether inadvertent
or a result of inability to agree-can be cured by filling the gaps.
Indeed, the Code provides gap fillers for almost every aspect of the
deal, and gives broad permission for courts to fill gaps by incorporating
practices and unwritten customs.' Here, too, the underlying principle is
that the parties' intent to contract should be the ultimate test. However,
the Code's gap-filling jurisprudence is founded on a different empirical
basis. The empirical premise is that agreements are intended by the
parties to be binding even when they leave, as they often do, many
terms open.9

There is some debate as to whether modem courts take the doctrine
of indefiniteness seriously. On the one hand, the Code's liberal gapfilling platform, imitated by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (the
"Second Restatement"),' 0 gives grounds for the belief that parties can
nowadays enforce contracts with almost any term left open, as long as
the circumstances indicate the intent to be bound. Gap fillers are
available on price, payment terms, duration, delivery terms, and many
2
others," effectively constituting a standardized statutory contract.' On
the other hand, some evidence has recently been collected that the
doctrine of indefiniteness continues to play a major role in court
decisions, barring the supplementation and enforcement of gap-ridden
agreements.' 3 However, regardless of the extent to which the doctrine
of indefiniteness continues to bar enforcement, it is clear that both the
traditional common law and the Code regard indefinite contracts as
posing a problem of binary choice. Either a full-blown contract can be
assembled with the aid of gap fillers, or the contract is unenforceable. It
is an all-or-nothing choice.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 33 cmt. c
7.
("The more terms the parties leave open, the less likely it is that they have intended to
conclude a binding agreement.").
U.C.C. § 2-204(3).
8.
Id. § 2-204 (stating that "commercial standards on the point of
9.
'indefiniteness' are intended to apply").
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 33.
10.
U.C.C. §§ 2-304 to -310.
11.
See, e.g., JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
12.
CODE § 3-4 (4th ed. 1995).
See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite
13.
Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1652-61 (2003) (analyzing a sample of cases
with indefinite contracts, many of which were not enforced).
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2.

AGREEMENTS TO AGREE

Agreements to agree are a particular type of indefinite agreement
that have received special attention and have been adjudged under a
more particularized set of rules. In agreements to agree, parties
affirmatively acknowledge the indefiniteness of their agreement and state
their intent (or hope) that further negotiations will enable them to reach
a more complete agreement. When the further negotiations fail and no
agreement emerges, courts are usually unwilling to apply gap fillers and
enforce the contract.' 4 Interestingly, the missing terms, which the
parties left for further negotiation and agreement, are no more material
than terms that courts readily supplement into other indefinite
agreements.' 5 It is not the materiality of the terms per se that prevents
gap filling, but rather the fact that the parties explicitly identified them
as the subject matter for further affirmative agreement. Apparently, the
inference many courts draw is that when parties agree to agree, they
have not yet agreed and thus they do not yet intend to be bound. Such
agreements merely mark a stage in the precontractual negotiations in
which certain substance has been resolved and should be
memorialized. 6

While agreements to agree are normally deemed unenforceable,
other closely related forms of preliminary agreements are more
regularly enforced.
For example, "agreements in principle" or
agreements "subject to a contract," in which parties draft the outline of
their agreement and acknowledge that some details need to be worked
out, are held enforceable even in cases where they are quite bare. 7
It might appear, then, that the jurisprudence of precontractual
agreements in general, and of agreement to agree in particular, exhibits
that same "all-or-nothing" feature that characterizes the doctrine of
indefiniteness. Either the precontractual agreement manifests sufficient
intent to be bound so as to be supplemented and enforced, or it does not
manifest such intent and is unenforceable. In this area of precontractual
14.
1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 2.8 (Joseph M. Perillo ed.,
rev. ed. 1993).
15.
For example, when the contract is silent about payment terms, the Code
instructs that full payment "is due at the time and place at which the buyer is to receive
the goods." See U.C.C. § 2-310(a). However, when parties agree to agree on payment
terms, the agreement may be deemed unenforceable. See Ansorge v. Kane, 155 N.E.
683, 685 (N.Y. 1927).
16.
See, e.g., Empco Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423, 425 (7th
Cir. 1989) (stating that letters of intent and agreement to bargain are only a stage in the

negotiations and do not give rise to liability).
17.

Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 788-89 (Tex. Ct. App.

1987) (holding that the agreement-in-principle is a binding contract because there was
intent to be bound).
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In
liability, however, the all-or-nothing characteristic is eroding.
practice, even when the agreement does not rise to a full-blown contract
and is deemed unenforceable for the purpose of contractual remedies,
the parties' freedom to walk away from it has been somewhat limited by
courts. With the emergence of the good-faith duties, courts have
increasingly limited the privilege of parties, who made serious albeit
partial precontractual manifestations of intent, to retract.' 8 The freedom
from contract that parties in these situations historically enjoyed was
constrained. Specifically, many courts have been requiring parties who
entered agreements to agree to indeed make an honest effort to reach an
agreement, and have been tailoring some measure of reliance liability to
a breach of this duty.'

9

Accordingly, an arbitrary decision by a party to

walk away from the negotiation could give rise to liability without
requiring the court to supplement missing terms.
B.

The Theory of Gap Filling

Filling gaps in incomplete contracts was elevated from a contextspecific inquiry to a generalizable theory when it was noticed that while
contractual gaps vary in contexts and in substance, there are unifying
rationales to filling them. Although gaps concerning contingent voting
rights in a complex merger agreement have nothing in common with
gaps concerning missing payment dates in a lease contract, the formula
by which the law fills these gaps-what judges have to consider in order
to generate the gap filler-may have a lot in common.
The reason there can be competing theories of gap filling is the
recognition that there exist different systematic sources for
incompleteness. Gaps in contracts are not random holes, but arise from
identified imperfections in the negotiation process. Diagnosing these
imperfections yields solutions for redressing them, namely, standards
for filling the gaps.

See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractualliability and Preliminary
18.
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 223-43
(1987) [hereinafter Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability] (describing the different
grounds for precontractual liability); Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to
Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673, 679-81 (1969) (explaining the emergence of the
obligation to negotiate in good faith as an intermediate solution between the traditional
all or nothing results).

19.

See, e.g., Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F.

Supp. 491, 498-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A., 117 Cal.
Some courts, while following Tribune Co., assign
Rptr. 2d 875, 885 (2002).

expectation liability for the breach of "Tribune-duties."

See, e.g., Venture Assocs.

Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that unless
too uncertain, expectation remedies should be awarded).
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Accordingly, it is often said that there are two distinct efficiencybased theories for gap filling.2" Each of these theories diagnoses a
different reason for the contractual incompleteness, and provides gap
fillers that address the diagnosed source of incompleteness. In order to
succeed in developing an additional theory of gap filling, it will be
necessary to identify a different source of incompleteness, one that is not
addressed by existing gap-filling formula. Before doing that, however,
let us briefly recall the existing theories.
1.

MIMIC THE PARTIES' WILL

One reason for incompleteness is the cost of drafting a complete
agreement. An agreement that addresses all possible contingencies
involves costly negotiations and drafting. The underlying premise is
that a complete contingent agreement can be reached, if only the parties
invest sufficient effort and attention to the details. But the cost of
attending to the fine details and to remote contingencies may exceed the
doing so, making it rational to leave gaps in the
benefit from
21
agreement.
The assumption that transactions costs are the reason for
incompleteness generates a "mimicking" principle of gap filling. The
law should equate the missing provisions with the hypothetical consentthe terms the parties would have agreed upon. By mimicking the
parties' hypothetical will, the law is enabling the parties to save the
transaction costs of drafting these very same terms expressly. Or, put
differently, by correctly mimicking the parties' will, the law is enabling
the parties to save the transaction costs of expressly opting out of the
legal default rules.
The mimicking theory is based on a premise that there exists an
underlying "will" or hypothetical consent. Namely, there are specific
definitive terms that the parties would have rationally agreed upon had
they paid sufficient attention to the matter. The only challenge is to
identify these terms. Accordingly, if the judicial task of identifying the
hypothetical consent is straightforward, then courts can tailor
individually optimal gap fillers: ones that are rational for these parties.
20.

See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in I THE

NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY FOR ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 585 (Peter Newman ed.,

1998) [hereinafter Ayres, Default Rules]; Richard Craswell, Contract Law: General
Theories, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit
de Geest eds., 2000). For the argument that the two gap-filling theories are merely two
perspectives on one unifying approach, see Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell,
Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 1615, 1618-19 (1999).
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. F[SCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
21.
OF CORPORATE LAW 3 (1991); Craswell, supra note 20, at 3.
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And if the judicial task of identifying the hypothetical consent is more
difficult, in light of the heterogeneity of contracting parties and the
uncertainty concerning the circumstances, then courts could use
"majoritarian" or "one-size-fits-all" default rules: ones that are rational
for most similarly-situated parties. 22 Either way, the rationale for
choosing the content of any default provision is to minimize transaction
costs: the cost of opting into specific terms. Mimicking defaults
appropriately addresses the drafting cost source of incompleteness.
2.

PENALTY DEFAULT RULES

23

Another reason for incompleteness of a contract has to do with
information asymmetry. When parties are differently informed about an
aspect of the deal, they may either draft provisions that are suboptimal,
or neglect to address an issue that otherwise, in the presence of perfect
information, would have been addressed. For example, a party may fail
to alert her counterpart to the fact that she assigns idiosyncratically high
value to performance, resulting in the counterpart failure to take the
necessary higher precaution against breach. Since private information
can be advantageous, it may not be revealed, which leaves the
agreement that should optimally be tailored to the content of this
information, incomplete.
If the one-sidedness of information is the cause of contractual
incompleteness, gap fillers can be designed to induce information
sharing. They can do so by "punishing" the informed party. If, in the
presence of contractual silence, the default provision is unfavorable to
the informed party, then this party will be induced to opt-out of it by
drafting an express provision. In the process of reaching such an
express agreement, information is shared and the information
asymmetry is overcome. Thus, for example, if the default remedy for
breach of contract is limited to "average" or foreseeable damages, then
the party who stands to suffer high idiosyncratic profit loss from breach
will have the incentive to draft a higher liquidated damage provision.
This liquidated damage provision thereby communicates her private
information about her expected profit. Such gap fillers are often named
"information-forcing" default rules.

22.

Ayres, Default Rules, supra note 20, at 586.

23.

The term "penalty default rules" was coined in ran Ayres & Robert

Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,
99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). A similar information-cost theory of gap filling was
developed contemporaneously by Lucian A. Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and
the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L.
EcON. & ORG. 284, 286 (1991).
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3.

DEFINITIVE DEFAULT RULES

The mimic-the-parties'-will approach and the penalty defaults
approach share at least one important common feature: they both
supplement the parties' obligation with a definitive provision. To the
extent that the parties can anticipate what the gap filler would be-and
both theories rely on the parties' ability to anticipate the gap fillers'the set of legal obligations governing the transaction is fully determined.
Whether the obligations are based on express provisions or on legally
supplied default terms, they are definitive 5
But definitive default terms are not the only conceptual way to deal
with ambiguity. Consider by analogy computer software. Programs
always start with preset defaults that usually represent the average user's
preferences-what most people would have selected if they had the
chance to try and experience different settings. These are definitive
majoritarian defaults. One can also imagine penalty defaults, utilizing
settings that most users would not want, eliciting setting reversals and
"preference revelation." But some features are set such that no prior
setting is selected; requiring that the user will make an affirmative
selection (e.g., click one of several buttons) or else the feature will not
be activated and the process will be stalled. These are nondefmitive
defaults: the settings are not fully determined (although they might be
narrowed down to several popular choices), but as a result of the
different selections made by different users, the program will eventually
run with each user's most favorable setting. In the analysis below, I
will argue that contractual ambiguity could potentially be dealt with in a
similar manner, utilizing nondefinitive default options.
II.
A.

DELIBERATE INCOMPLETENESS

When Do Parties Prefer Indefiniteness?

Once it is concluded that the parties entered into a binding
agreement, default rules-whether mimicking or penalty defaultssupplement any incompleteness in the agreement with definitive and
predictable terms.
This basic feature of gap-filling law has the
implication that parties cannot create liability while leaving any of their
obligations legally blank. If they want to create liability, then whatever
24.

See generally Craswell, supra note 20; E. ALAN

FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS

§§ 1.10, 7.15, at 36, 495 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that courts assume that parties recognize
the default provisions and can opt out of them).
Indeed, by its legal definition a "contract" cannot be incomplete. U.C.C.
25.
§ 1-201(12) (2003) (defining "contract" as "the total legal obligation that results from
the parties' agreement as determined by [the Code]," and including all the gap fillers).
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obligation they leave unresolved the law would eventually supply. True,
it might be unclear at the time of the agreement how the law would
supplement the missing term, but it is clear that if the agreement would
be held binding, it would be supplemented. Thus, imagine a situation in
which parties who negotiate over an aspect of the deal cannot reach
consent. If they leave this issue open, and if the gap is not too severe to
render the contract unenforceable due to indefiniteness, a gap filler will
kick in to resolve the issue. But the parties would anticipate this and
realize that leaving a blank is equivalent to agreeing to a definitive term
that is identical to the gap-filler. That is, when gaps are filled by
definitive default provisions, parties are effectively precluded from
leaving an issue unresolved.
This feature of contract law could, at times, conflict with the
parties' interests. In the discussion to follow, I will argue that there is
both a theoretical and an empirical basis for the claim that parties have
an interest in unresolved agreements. In a nutshell, the parties may
want to leave an issue unresolved when they want actual, rather than
inferred consent to govern. That is, each party may seek to maintain a
veto power over the specific term to avoid having to surrender to a
compromise which she never embraced. Parties may seek to maintain
the power to reject any undesired term. At the same time, they want the
other issues that were already agreed upon not to be reopened
unilaterally. Once this claim is established, it will provide the necessary
foundation for a different approach to gap filling, one that does not
utilize definitive defaults.
1.

CONCEPTUAL GROUNDS

Can rational parties choose to leave part of their agreement
deliberately incomplete? One way to think about this, which was
offered in a thought-provoking and influential paper by mathematician
Robert Aumann, is to characterize situations in which parties may agree
to disagree.26 Aumann showed this agree to disagree situation to be
possible by identifying the conditions for the opposite to be true: when it
is that parties cannot agree to disagree. The logic of his claim is,
roughly, the following: if one party knows that the other party's view is
different from his own, she should revise her own view so as to take
into account the fact that the other party may have some different
information justifying her view." The other party would follow the
26.

Robert J. Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree, 4 ANNALS STATS. 1236, 1236

(1976).
27.

More precisely, a player's updating should occur only if the player shares

common "priors," such that a player can attribute the opponent's differing view to "new
information," rather than a "bias." It also requires that the shared priors be common
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same updating process. Thus, for example, if two doctors have
differing views or predictions on how a certain medical procedure would
affect the patient, each basing her view on her own prior experience,
then each would rely on the other doctor's position as a valid reason to
update her own. As long as their views are different, this convergenceby-inferences dynamic will remain in action. In equilibrium, the parties'
views will converge.
The lesson from Aumann's insight is not that disagreements are
impossible, but rather that different opinions or views among rational
parties can be maintained only in the presence of initial biases or
prejudices. In the doctors example, they may remain in disagreement if,
say, each considers her own training as superior (a "prejudice"), or if
each is influenced by the salience of her own prior experience (a
Disagreements cannot be solely attributed to one-sided
"bias").
28
information. Information-based differences in views "wash out."
Aumann's theorem, by articulating the conditions under which
disagreement would be overcome also tells us the flip side, namely,
when a disagreement cannot be overcome-when parties will agree to
disagree. It suggests that even rational parties who are willing to update
their own views in light of the views of others may fail to reach
consensus, if they either have different priors (biases or prejudices), or
if their private information is not sufficiently well communicated to
trigger the inference process.
When an "agreement to disagree" results from different initial
beliefs on what is going to happen, there is little reason to expect that
the parties would eventually be able to resolve their differences. If
parties attribute the gap in their positions not to private information but
to a preference-based divergence, they would not reach consensus. If a
buyer and a seller negotiating the sale of a firm have different
probability assessments concerning the future profitability of the firm
that are not based on private information but rather on psychological
factors, prejudices, or tastes, then agreement may permanently elude
them.
On the other hand, an "agreement to disagree" may also occur even
when parties are not influenced by such biases, but instead find it
difficult to credibly communicate views and information. For example,
the buyer of the firm may be ready to infer that the firm is worth more
than she thought if she figures out why the seller is asking for a high
price. While the seller's information cannot be directly conveyed, his

knowledge. See, e.g., DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY § 14.3.2, at
548-49 (1991).
See Moriss H. DeGroot, Reaching a Consensus, 69 J. AM. STAT. L. Ass'N
28.
118, 118(1974).
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assessments can. As long as the buyer cannot reliably infer all that the
seller knows, disagreement may persist.
Interestingly, disagreement that arises from a difficulty to
communicate the underlying information between the parties may be
Over several rounds of communicating each other's
short lived.
opinions the parties would eventually revise their views, infer each
other's information, and reach agreement.29 An interim negotiation
stage may exhibit an agreement to disagree, to be resolved later as more
updating takes place.
In real-life negotiations, this interim stage might be a long one.
Parties may be unable to agree on an issue, but still recognize that their
inability to agree could eventually be overcome as more of their private
information is credibly shared. This perceived "temporariness" of the
disagreement could manifest itself in a phased agreement, whereby
parties postpone the resolution of some term of their agreement. While
the decision-theoretic model of agreeing to disagree explains the
paradoxical logic of such agreements, one may still wonder why parties
bother to enter into an initial partial agreement. Why do they not wait
until negotiations reach a more advanced state and enter into the full
blown agreement then? One answer to this puzzle, which will be
discussed below, focuses on incentives to rely. It will be shown that
"agreeing now to agree later" 30 could be an optimal approach for the
parties to focus their precontractual investments by ruling out other
possible terms. But before turning to the utility of phased agreements,
let us first briefly discuss the prominence of this practice.
2.

NEGOTIATION PRACTICES

Parties to complex negotiations may deliberately choose to leave
parts of their agreement incomplete. This incompleteness is not an
oversight but a strategy aimed at increasing the chance for success. To
begin with, in complex deals it is not possible to tackle all issues
simultaneously. Consensus is achieved piecemeal as different aspects of
the transaction are brought up. There usually comes a point in the
negotiations when sufficient issues are resolved that some commitment
between the parties becomes desirable. The arrival at partial agreement
does not represent a conclusion or a negotiation peak, but rather a
For a model in which agents need several rounds to revise their opinions
29.
and to reach consensus, see generally John D. Geanakoplos & Heraklis M.
Polemarchakis, We Can't DisagreeForever, 28 J. ECON. THEORY 192 (1982).

30.

This term is the title of an intriguing discussion paper. Oliver Hart & John

Moore, Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but Do Not Rule In (Nat'l

Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10397.pdf.

w10397, 2004). available at
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necessary stage toward a more complete agreement. At this stage,
parties expect that the remaining issues will be resolved through
continued negotiations.
Agreements are not achieved at once because the resolution of
various issues involve different degrees of difficulty. The parties may
believe that the obstacles to agreement for some issues may subside after
most of the transaction is determined, or that future negotiations may
succeed where present negotiations failed. For instance, change in
external conditions or the identity of the negotiating agents may remove
a roadblock to agreement. Parties may also set aside sticky issues in the
hope that they might be able to sidestep them, as when the likelihood of
a relevant contingency declines.
Specifically, it is commonly recognized in negotiation manuals that
contentious issues should be avoided in initial stages of the negotiation
as they might "place unbearable strain on the overall settlement
process." 3' Parties are encouraged to tackle easier issues first to reach
as much consensus as possible, thereby increasing their own motivation
and incentive to find ways to resolve the contentious issues.32 Or each
may believe that delay will result in a more favorable resolution.33 The
effort spent to reach partial agreement, the dynamic of goodwill from
this effort, and the increased awareness of the potential surplus from a
complete agreement may create a context amenable to the resolution of
the remaining issues.'
This "agreeing-to-disagree" strategy, it should be noted, is different
than the negotiation strategy of resorting to a third party's neutral
arbitrational authority. The latter strategy exposes each party to greater
risk by removing their veto power. Such third-party resolution is
appropriate for parties who are willing to accept a compromise, but have
conflicting views on what is fair. But in the situations discussed above,
parties are not yet ready to commit to a compromise and prefer to
DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 97
31.
(1986) (noting that parties should avoid contentious issues that may render agreement

impossible).
FRED CHARLES IKL9, How NATIONS NEGOTIATE 1, 18 (1964) ("If there is a
32.
conflict about many issues, the less controversial ones should be solved first because
on
algreements
agreement .... [and
to
further
lead
will
agreement

disagreement ....can be used to isolate unsettled issues so as to facilitate agreement on
other matters."); GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS 309 (2000) ("One puzzlesolving heuristic is to solve the easy part of the puzzle first; once that part is solved, the

harder parts of the puzzle may seem easier.").
See, e.g., LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 31, at 96-97 ("Negotiations often
33.
leave much ambiguity with the tacit understanding that a definite resolution of the issue
perhaps strongly favoring one party will later become necessary. ").
34.
TULUMELLO,

Id. at 222; ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, Scorr R. PEPPEr & ANDREW S.
BEYOND WINNING:

DISPUTES 251 (2000).
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maintain their veto power over a nonconsensual resolution. If anything,
"agreeing to disagree" is similar to nonbinding mediation agreements.
In such situations, parties believe that a procedure of incremental
commitments would increase their chances of success.
In any event, when parties leave their agreement deliberately
incomplete, they are making a commitment to be bound to the agreed
upon terms, conditional on the remaining terms being resolved in a
manner satisfactory to them. While this is not a commitment to the fullblown contract that was not yet finalized, it is a commitment to the
relationship and to refrain from unilateral departure.35 A complete
freedom to walk away would conflict with the subtle dynamics of the
negotiation and indicate that even resolved issues can be unilaterally
reopened, thus diminishing the value of initial understandings. Since
this value generates further agreement, a norm of unrestricted freedom
to retract would be detrimental to the successful resolution of a
negotiation.
For example, in the context of negotiations between states a
bargaining norm of no-retraction-from-preliminary-understandings is
recognized. When a negotiating party manifests its position, it is
considered improper to "revert to a harder position from a more
conciliatory one." 36 Treaties are negotiated article-by-article and
[w]hile it is understood that the parties are not bound by their
acceptance to individual articles in the way they are bound by
the conclusion of a final agreement, each party expects that its
opponent will generally preserve agreed parts as the building
blocks for the overall agreement. The very fact that the parties
laboriously negotiate with each other to settle their issues point
by point constitutes an implied promise that yesterday's work
will not be destroyed tomorrow by reopening these partial
agreements."'
In fact, international negotiators do not share private law's legalistic
view that agreements to agree are not enforceable. In treaty law, "there
35.
LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 31, at 279-80 (emphasizing the informal
sanctions of breaking contingent agreements); Roy J. LEWICKI ET AL., NEGOTIATION:
READINGS, EXERCISES, AND CASES 100 (2d ed. 1993) (advocating that negotiators
strategically make only tentative commitments until an entire agreement is reached).
36.
IKLt, supra note 32, at 22-23.
37.
Id. at 99. This argument does not conflict with the common practice of
"issue trading," whereby concessions already made can be traded away to win
agreement over a stalemated issue. In fact, the only reason that a party might have the
power to trade away a concession is the informal recognition by the other party that this
concession is otherwise not freely retractable. See G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR
ADVANTAGE 170(1999).
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is little doubt that parties can enter in legally binding 'agreements to
agree."18
3.

THE BENEFITS OF GRADUAL COMMITMENT

The argument thus far suggests that agreements to disagree are both
logically possible and are regularly used to embody a mild form of
commitment in practice, but it has yet to explore the reasons why such
intermediate forms of commitment should not be freely retractable under
the law. Shouldn't parties be free to walk away anytime prior to full
agreement without suffering legal consequences? In thinking about what
negotiating parties gain from constraining their mutual ability to walk
away before full agreement is reached, there are various sources of
value that might be recognized. One type of benefit has to do with
psychological and cognitive effects that are associated with a gradual
compromise. Concessions that may be hard to make if framed as a
lumpy, measurable departure from the ideal terms may be easier to
digest in small portions.3 9 Here, the value of entering into partial
commitments in the intermediate stage is the fragmentation of the
otherwise hard to swallow large commitment. (Is this not the major
reason why premarital commitments grow gradually as a common
feature preceding the full-blown marriage?) Thus, if parties were free
to walk away anytime prior to a full formal agreement, these partial
understandings would amount to naught, and the potential for a gradual
progression of the commitment would be forfeited.
Another benefit arising from the existence of a precontractual
commitment has to do with the integrity of the negotiation process. It is
increasingly recognized by legal writers that when the risk of parties
walking away is diminished, the ritual of contract negotiation is taken
more seriously. Greater trust emerges when parties enter the bargaining
when they are ready to do business and refrain from making misleading
gestures. 4 Put differently, the signal that an entrance into negotiations
transmits with respect to the propensity of a party to work towards a
deal is more powerful the greater is the sanction for walking away. 4 1
38.
WATSON, supra note 32, at 65.
39.
See, e.g., ROBERT C. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 15 (2d
ed. 1988) ("The trick is to bring up the options independently of one another so that
each small price will seem petty when compared to the already-determined much larger
price. ").
40.
See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 687-88, 696-97,
699, 133 N.W.2d 267, 269, 274-75 (1965); Farnsworth, PrecontractualLiability, supra
note 18, at 220.
41.
This "signaling" effect is recognized in the international negotiations
literature.
See, e.g., Lloyd Jensen, Soviet-American Behavior in Disarmament
Negotiations, in THE 50% SOLUTION: How TO BARGAIN SUCCESSFULLY WITH HIJACKERS,
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Why is some form of interim commitment useful for the parties?
We might worry that the opposite is true, that any form of
precontractual commitment-any limitation of the freedom from
contract-might cause parties to think twice before entering
negotiations. Such precontractual commitments, if backed up by legal
liability, might chill incentives to bargain and reduce the incidence of
surplus-creating negotiations.42
One explanation for the value-enhancing effect of precontractual
liability focuses on the incentives to invest in the relationship. 3 In the
same manner that contractual liability is instrumental in promoting
reliance on the contractual promise, precontractual liability can be
instrumental in promoting reliance on the partial, precontractual
commitment. Such precontractual reliance on negotiations can take
many forms. It may involve the forgoing of opportunities to negotiate
with other partners," loss of job offers and promotions,4 5 training and
investment in relationship-specific assets," acquisition or sharing of
information, 47 investment in the real estate by a potential tenant,48 and
many more. These are costly activities that parties undertake in order to
increase the size of the "pie" that any agreement would subsequently
divide.
In the absence of some kind of commitment, parties will apply
greater caution and expend less in precontractual reliance, in fear that
such investment might be wasted if the other party walks away, or that
STRIKERS, BOSSES, OIL MAGNATES, ARABS, RUSSIANS, AND OTHER WORTH OPPONENTS IN

THIS MODERN WORLD 289 (1. William Zartman ed., 1976).
42.
See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.64, at 384
(3d ed. 2004) (describing "an undesirable chilling effect" discouraging parties from
entering negotiations); Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk
Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385, 416-17, 445-46
(1999) (arguing that liability for pretrade representations in the event of negotiation
breakdown would "cause the market to shrink" and force parties to utilize more cautious
bargaining strategies, thus wasting opportunities for efficient trade).
Several scholars have argued that liability can enhance precontractual
43.
reliance. Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 481, 482-83 (1996); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of
Promissory Estoppel in PreliminaryNegotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1308-09 (1996).
For a formal analysis of the particular rules of liability that can induce efficient reliance,
see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, PrecontractualReliance, 30 J.
LEGAL STUD. 423 (2001).
44.
Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. at 498-99.
Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d. 114, 115 (Minn. 1981).
45.
46.
Hoffman, 26 Wis. 2d at 696-97, 133 N.W.2d at 274-75.
Venture Assoc. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys., 96 F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir.
47.
1996) ("[Complex negotiations] often [are] costly and time-consuming. The parties may
want assurance that their investments in time and money and effort will not be wiped out
by the other party's footdragging or change of heart or taking advantage of a vulnerable
position created by the negotiation. ").
48.
Hammond v. Ringstad, 10 Alaska 543, 544 (D. Alaska 1945).
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reliance will make them vulnerable to hold-up by the other party. The
benefits a party can enjoy from any reliance investment are diminished
by the chance that the deal will fall through or by the ability of the other
party to expropriate some of the surplus created by the investment.
Indeed, this is one reason why parties who enter complex and costly
negotiations are careful to first agree on some precontractual
arrangements for cost reimbursement in the event that negotiations fail . 9
Accordingly, parties enter into partial agreements and agreements
to agree in the hope that they will have some binding force to provide
some measure of security and encourage each other to keep investing in
the success of the relationship. Because it is costly to invest in
negotiations, each party must sacrifice some freedom to walk away in
order to encourage the other party to negotiate. The precontractual
commitment enables a party to commit to a specific partner and a
specific negotiation protocol without committing to specific terms. In
the presence of such a commitment, the risk each party faces of her
counterpart's unilateral abandonment of the relationship is diminished.
Greater relationship-specific investment emerges with this added
confidence, and with greater investment a profitable full-blown contract
is more likely to arise.
Another way to think about the value of a partially binding
agreement to agree is to recognize the "self-fulfilling prophecy" that it
embodies: when parties are faced with issues that are difficult to resolve,
the memorialization of the resolved issues and an agreement to agree
over the unresolved issues-if coupled with some liability for
breakdown-helps the parties resolve the remaining issues. The notion
that an agreement to agree is a "contradiction in terms" 50 and that a
contract to make a contract is conceptually impossible overlooks this
self-fulfilling effect. A contract to make a contract, if it is associated
with some liability, can make the subsequent contract more likely. Part
III will explore an intermediate liability regime that creates this gradual
commitment effect.
B.

The Inadequacy of Standard Gap Fillers

Having argued that contractual gaps can arise from the transactors'
deliberate choice to phase the agreement process, the next step of the
49.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Contracts-Only with Consent, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1873 (2004) (surveying a variety of self-imposed precontractual liability schemes);
Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1,
27 (showing that most firms make irrevocable offers).
50.
Shepard v. Carpenter, 55 N.W. 906, 906 (Minn. 1893) (finding that "an
agreement that they will in the future make such contract as they may then agree upon
amounts to nothing"); Ridgway v. Wharton, 6 Eng. Rep. 237, 268 (1857); see also I
CORUIN, supra note 14, § 2.8, at 134.
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argument is to demonstrate that standard approaches to gap filling are
ill-equipped to address the needs and concerns that give rise to such
deliberate gaps. Standard gap-filling techniques provide a single
definitive provision that the parties are assumed to anticipate. When the
parties take into account the legally supplied default term, they cannot
effectively leave portions of their deal unresolved for future negotiation
and agreement. Whether it is the express agreement or the background
default rules that define the totality of obligations, there is a fully
determined set of legal obligations. No further stipulation of terms by
the parties is required.51
For example, if an explicit agreement over price is absent but the
law supplements the contract with a definitive term, either the
reasonable majoritanian price or a contra-proferentem (penalty) price
provision, then the parties would recognize this default provision and
consider the deal to be obligationally complete.5 2 Contracting in the
shadow of this definitive default term is equivalent to explicitly drafting
this term into the contract. Any desire that the parties might have had to
reach a binding commitment and to leave the price term open for future
voluntary resolution would be frustrated by a court-imposed
compromise.
Put differently, once it is recognized that the gap in the agreement
is due neither to drafting costs nor to one-sided superior information,
there is no prima facie reason to expect that either a mimicking or a
penalty-default provision would be desirable. Often, parties endure long
and costly negotiations before deciding to leave a term open. In these
cases, parties search for ways to explicitly state the incompleteness of
their agreement, which is probably more costly to draft than a definitive
reasonable provision. That is, the saving of drafting costs-the rationale
of the mimic-the-parties'-will theory-cannot explain the gap.
Similarly, the failure of the parties to agree on a term is not necessarily
due to one party's superior information. True, nonagreement may arise
as a result of each party safely hiding his or her private information or
reservation value.
However, this is not the type of one-sided
information that the law is necessarily interested in forcing out of the
parties by means of a penalty default. In these deliberate incompleteness

51.
The law recognizes interim forms of agreement, under which the
obligations are not fully determined but the parties are required to negotiate them in
good faith. See Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp at 498. Here, however, the incomplete
agreement is wholly unenforceable. A breach of the good-faith duty usually does not
give rise to contract damages.
52.
True, the parties would have to be able to anticipate what price the court
would supplement, but their ability to do so is the foundation of standard default rule
theories. Without it, parties cannot be assumed to opt out of non-mimicking defaults and
cannot be incentivized to reveal private information in opting out of penalty defaults.
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cases, the underlying justifications for standard gap-filling techniques
are not valid.
C. The Inadequacy of the No-Enforcement Approach
When a contract is recognized to be deliberately incomplete, it is
usually thought that the correct legal response is to refrain altogether
from filling the gap due to absence of assent. After all, each party had a
different term in mind, and they manifested a preference to have an
incomplete set of obligations and to postpone further agreement until a
later date. Contract enforcement requires an objectively manifested
meeting of the minds and here we have an indication of the opposite, of
an absence of consent.
The problem with this no-supplementation regime is that it implies
nonenforcement of the entire (albeit partial) agreement reached by the
parties.53 If the court does not supply a definitive term, then it is
impossible to determine the plaintiff's expectation interest, and thus the
remaining solution is to deem the contract too indefinite to be enforced.
If the parties left the price intentionally undetermined, then a policy not
to supply a price term renders the whole deal unenforceable. 4 But such
nonenforceability implies that the parties can freely walk away from the
agreed-upon terms, and later reenter negotiations to revise these terms.
In that case, nonenforceability of the precontractual agreement frustrates
the ability of the parties to "rule out" terms.
One way to defend the no-supplementation approach is to recognize
that parties often prefer their agreement to be governed by norms other
than legal sanctions. This account has been developed recently by
Robert Scott, who notes that indefiniteness is often a deliberate drafting
choice of the parties, who "appear to prefer the indefinite agreement
they concluded to the more explicit and verifiable alternative that they
ignored." 55 Deliberate gaps make room for subsequent informal
agreement, which in turn is driven by reciprocal fairness. Agreements
to agree, under this view, should be unenforceable in order to enable the
parties to utilize informal methods of self-enforcement such as
reciprocity.
While Scott's explanation for the existence of indefinite agreements
and of agreements to agree is different than the one offered in this
See Drees Farming Ass'n v. Thompson, 246 N.W.2d 883, 886 (N.D.
53.
1976) (finding that nonsupplementation of an option of renewal under "terms to be
negotiated" would make the option meaningless); 1 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra
note 42, § 3.8a, at 213-14.
54.

See, e.g., Joseph Martin, Jr.,

Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417

N.E.2d 541, 544 (N.Y. 1981); 1 CORBIN, supra note 15, § 4.1, at 532.
55.
Scott, supra note 13, at 1657.
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Article, it shares the fundamental observation of the existence of
deliberately incomplete agreements. Scott also observes that one of the
strategies available to parties negotiating an agreement is to leave some
terms unresolved in the expectation that their resolution will become
possible in the future course of their relationship, and in the expectation
that the law will not fill the gaps with a mid-range compromise. But
while Scott argues that there should be no legal sanction on a party who
retracts from such an agreement, to leave room for informal
negotiations, the account developed in this Article focuses on settings in
which such informal negotiations failed.
Moreover, the premise that parties may not want the court to
interfere with the resolution of the remaining issues does not imply that
the parties also consider the formally drafted portions of the agreement
nonbinding. Why else did they draft them into "legal" language? While
the agreement is incomplete, it does contain some elements of consent
that the parties did draft into a formal format. Making the agreement
wholly unenforceable, even in those cases where norms of reciprocity
failed to provide a resolution, and allowing the parties to walk away
freely, would frustrate this accomplishment. It would undermine the
more subtle notions of commitment that emerge in the wake of partial
agreements. If the law were to enforce only the memorialized parts of
the agreement and not intervene in the unresolved parts, then the
commitment can be maintained and extralegal norms of reciprocity
could continue to regulate the missing terms.
It might seem that, presented with a deliberately incomplete
contract, the court's adjudicative choices include either aggressive
supplementation of terms with a definitive default provision or
nonenforcement of the contract entirely. The court is faced with an allor-nothing choice, and can either supplement the gaps and enforce the
deal as if it were complete ("all"), or consider it a preliminary,
nonbinding deal ("nothing"). In particular, this dichotomy suggests that
the court cannot apply a partial enforcement approach, and enforce only
the agreed upon terms.
In the next Part, I will argue that this all-or-nothing feature,
although it fairly describes many areas of the law, is not optimal and not
necessary. When the parties affirmatively choose to leave a matter open
for further negotiation and yet manifest an intent to be bound to the
resolved issues, a legal regime different than the current all-or-nothing
regime is called for. In these situations, an intermediate regime that
supplements and enforces such deliberately incomplete deals without
writing the missing elements of the contract over for the parties is
preferable and, indeed, available.
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III. PRO-DEFENDANT GAP FILLERS
A.

Decoupling the Default Rule

Consider a situation in which parties negotiate a contested issue
(say, a contingent price), with each insisting on a term that is favorable
to her. If the parties deadlock over this issue, yet proceed to draft an
agreement on the remaining issues, then each party can be deemed to
manifest consent to a complete contract that contains the agreed upon
terms and the term she demanded concerning the stalemated issue. That
is, assent by a party to the incomplete agreement that contains a "to-beagreed-upon" gap eliminates any reasonable grounds she might have to
reject the complete agreement when supplemented by the term she has
been openly seeking all along. This manifested consent is, of course,
"constructive." There is actual assent only to the part of the deal that
includes the expressly agreed-upon terms. But there is implied intent to
be bound to the part of the deal that was contested, as long as it is
resolved with the term that this party vied for.
In this situation where a contested issue is left deliberately open,
each party can be seen as manifesting assent to a different deal. It is as
if they drafted two contracts, identical in the components that contain all
the agreed-upon issues, but different in the components that contain the
contested issues. Each party wants to be bound to the contract that
contains her favorable terms. Thus, if one of these hypothetical
contracts were to be enforced against a party, it can only be the one to
which she assented, the one containing her favorable terms.
This interpretation of the deliberately incomplete agreement is
consistent with the parties' choice to address their differences by
entering into a partial understanding, rather than remaining silent or
walking away. If the parties recognize their deadlock and nevertheless
draft a partial agreement, they are indicating that some assent has been
obtained. They are also indicating, however, that each is seeking
different content to fill the remaining gap. Accordingly, the only way to
give efficacy to their intent is to decouple the remaining gap from the
agreed-upon terms.
How could that be done? Of course, neither party can enforce a
contract containing her own favorable terms, terms to which the other
party never surrendered. Instead, the power that each party would have
is to enforce upon her opponent a deal that, with respect to the contested
issues, includes the opponent's favored terms. A party can, of course,
choose not exercise this option, in which case-if the other party does
not exercise her own option-the "no contract" outcome remains. If the
incomplete contract is supplemented in such a manner, the enforcedagainst party, being granted the terms she either agreed to or unilaterally
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sought, cannot legitimately claim that she never intended to be bound to
it. Isn't this the deal she pursued all along? Liability here is grounded
not on what a party affirmatively or hypothetically assents to, but rather
on a reasonable restriction over what a party may reject.'
This gap-filling approach transforms the incomplete contract into a
set of two complete contracts. Essentially, the gap filler is "decoupled":
it is equal to the term favored by the party against whom enforcement is
sought. For example, if the seller demanded no less than $1000 and the
buyer was willing to pay no more than $800, and if every other term of
the transaction was agreed upon, then the seller can enforce a deal
supplemented by the buyer's price of $800 and the buyer can enforce a
deal supplemented by the seller's price of $1000. Hence, each party
receives an option to enforce a deal containing the term the other
requested. The precontractual agreement is transformed into a "double
option. "5'

Thus, unlike standard gap-filling approaches that trace a single
definitive term to best supplement the deal and apply this term
regardless of the identity of the party seeking enforcement, this
approach provides a pair of gap fillers. The majoritarian mimicking
approach to gap filling would supplement the missing price term in the
example above with one that is "reasonable," generally somewhere
between $800 and $1000. Such a term, however, forces a compromise
on the parties to which they did not assent, and perhaps affirmatively
rejected. But under the pro-defendant gap-filling approach, the plaintiff
asks the court to fill the gap with the defendant's terms, leaving no
possibility that an undesired contract is being imposed upon either of the
parties.
Note that filling the gap in a manner favorable to the defendant
does not force the plaintiff to transact under terms to which she does not
assent. The pro-defendant terms are enforced only if the plaintiff
prefers such a deal to the no-contract alternative. Essentially, the
question is not whether a party will want to enforce a contract
supplemented with the other party's terms (she often may not), but
whether the other party should be entitled to reject such favorable deal.

56.
For the moral basis of this principle of obligation, resting on the
nonrejectability of an individual's own representations, see generally T.M. Scanlon,
Contractualismand Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 103, 117 (Amartya
Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
See I DANIEL FRIEDMAN & NILI COHEN, CONTRACTS 289 (in Hebrew)
57.
(mentioning the technique of double option and arguing that "a substitute to no
supplementation can be found in the willingness of the plaintiff to acquiesce to the other
party's maximal demand with respect to the missing element.").
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B.

"Most Favorable" to the Defendant

In choosing as a default the term that is favorable to the enforcedagainst party, the example above identified this term by reference to the
party's express proposal. It was assumed that the parties exchanged
explicit communications, each stating her favored term, and failed to
strike a compromise. To complete the deal, each party was given an
option to incorporate the term proposed by the other. In that example,
the content of the gap filler-the term that is known to be desired by the
enforced-against party-was not hypothetical, but rather evidenced by
reference to her own affirmative representations.
In general, however, parties may leave a contract deliberately
incomplete without first going through the motions of making explicit
proposals and without marking their respective favorable terms. For
example, the parties to a lease contract may agree on a renewal period,
but leave the renewal price indefinite, "to be agreed upon," in the
expectation that it might be easier for them to reach assent at a later
stage. In these situations, there is no affirmative statement by any party
from which an inference can be drawn as to her favorable term. How
would the decoupled gap filler operate in this more general setting?
Supplementing the deal with the term the enforced-against party
proposed is a way to assure that the defendant is not subject to a
transaction laden with terms that she did not will. When a party
affirmatively proposes terms, it provides a strong basis to infer that the
party assents to those terms. The task to identify nonrejectable terms is
made straightforward. In the absence of an express proposal, a similar
principle of assent can be satisfied if the gap is supplemented by terms
that fulfill an equally powerful nonrejectability standard-terms that are
most favorable (within the set of reasonable terms) to the defendant.
While this party never expressly stated what these most favorable terms
are, the court would have to imagine the most that this party reasonably
hoped to gain when entering into the incomplete agreement and how this
party hoped, ex ante, to resolve the missing provisions. Instead of using
a majoritarian or an "average" term, the court would apply a biased
term, favorable to the defendant. Thus, the only difference between
situations in which the defendant made a proposal versus situations in
which he did not is the difficulty of ascertaining what are the defendant's
most favorable terms.
This generous pro-defendant supplementation guarantees that the
deal to be enforced is no worse than what the defendant could have
intended. It is the only deal to which it can confidently be said that the
What
defendant manifested her constructive intent to be bound.
reasonable grounds would the enforced-against party have to reject such
a favorable deal? Only opportunistic motives or a retraction from
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previous manifested intent can underlie a refusal to transact under such
favorable terms.
Surely, the notion of assent even to "most favorable" terms is a
fiction. It is less of a fiction, however, than the notion of assent to
mimicking defaults. Mimicking default rules-whether tailored or "onesize-fits-all"-are based on the premise that a mutual will of the parties
exists. This premise is problematic in incomplete contracts, particularly
ones in which the parties have reached a stalemate. As the court in
Walker v. Keith conceded, "[i]t is pure fiction to say the court. . . is
enforcing something the parties agreed to." 58 But the ideal of basing the
obligation on the party's will can nevertheless be fulfilled by gap fillers
that mimic the will of one party at a time-the terms this party favored.
Thus, in the presence of a deliberately incomplete contract, the
mimic-the-parties'-will default metamorphoses into a decoupled set of
mimic-one-party's-will terms, of which a single one is chosen according
to the identity of the party seeking enforcement. Assent to this term is
no more, and arguably less, fictitious than assent to standard gap fillers.
There is every reason to presume that when parties leave terms to be
agreed upon, they truly intend to permit enforcement of the deal on the
terms most favorable to them, and that each has granted the other party
an option to enforce the deal supplemented by such terms.
C. Scope
Pro-defendant gap fillers, whether derived from explicit proposals
the defendant made or from the constructive exercise of inferring the
defendant's most favorable terms, are likely to prescribe different gapfilling content than mimicking or reasonable terms. As emphasized
throughout this Article, this technique is not a substitute for standard
gap-filling standards, but rather should be viewed as complementary.
Pro-defendant gap fillers are an appropriate solution to indefiniteness
only when the gaps are left deliberately and the parties aim to resolve
them through negotiations. Before turning to doctrinal illustrations of
the proposed technique, two additional remarks concerning the
conceptual reach of pro-defendant gap fillers are in order.
The first remark concerns the size of the gaps that the proposed
technique can fill. Normally, when using standard majoritarian defaults,
courts are wary not to "write the contract over" for the parties. That is,
supplementation is conducted only when the gaps in the contract are not
too wide. Otherwise the presumption of hypothetical assent becomes

58.

382 S.W.2d 198, 203 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
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strained. 9 The same caution should apply to the application of the prodefendant default terms. True, when utilizing most favorable terms, the
notion of hypothetical one-sided assent can plausibly be stretched. A
party may be deemed to assent to terms most favorable to her even if the
set of agreed upon terms is small or even nonexistent. However, absent
a serious manifestation by this party that she intends to be bound to
some transaction with this counterpart, it would be dangerous to give the
other party an option to enforce a transaction, even one containing terms
that are very favorable to the enforced-against party. Such an option
would relinquish the freedom from contract and thus undermine the
security of property rights and the autonomy embedded in the
voluntariness of transfers. To avoid this result, gap filling under the
proposed theory can be restricted to instances when the express assent
by the enforced-against party is sufficiently substantial.
The second remark concerns the nature of assent to most favorable
defaults. By its definition, the concept of "assent" in contract law
embodies a tension between the true "factual" intent of the parties and
legally binding contractual terms. The set of binding consensual terms
does not always conform to what the parties truly intended, discussed,
and agreed upon. Doctrines such as the parol evidence rule, the battle
of the forms, and more generally the objective theory of assent, drive a
wedge between consent-in-fact and its legal translation-mutual assent.
As long as there are good conceptual and instrumental justifications for
this wedge, it serves a useful purpose.' Accordingly, the notion of
assent to most favorable default rules, to the extent that it is fictional,
would have to be defended on these bases. The conceptual basis-the
argument that most favorable default terms are consistent with assent in
deliberately incomplete contracts-has been developed thus far. I will
now turn to examine the instrumental defense.
D. Increasingthe ContractualSurplus
Parties may seek to form partially binding commitments for several
reasons. As argued above, such precontractual commitments help
parties digest concessions gradually, protect the integrity of the
negotiation arena, and promote investments in the relationship. 6 Does
the particular form of commitment proposed here, in which a retracting
party is bound to terms most favorable to her, suffice in achieving these
goals?
59.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 33(3) & cmt.
c (explaining that the more the terms that the parties leave open, the less likely it is that
they actually intended to conclude a binding agreement).
60.
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, § 3.6, at 116-18.
61.
See supra Part II.A.3.
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The conceptual analysis above showed that pro-defendant
supplementation of deliberately incomplete contracts is a way to create
contractual liability in a gradual manner. The more terms remain to be
agreed upon the more pro-defendant terms will be utilized as gap fillers,
and thus the smaller is the burden of liability to the defendant. While
the complete freedom to walk away is restricted, the practical cost of
this restriction is a function of the terms the defendant must put up with,
which, in the case of pro-defendant gap filling, is somewhere between
zero burden of no-contract and the high burden of a majoritarian
contract.
This intermediate form of liability fragments an otherwise hard-toswallow full contractual. commitment into sequential small steps. When
a precontractual agreement is binding but can only be enforced with
terms most favorable to a party, each party knows that by entering this
agreement she is effectively surrendering only the terms that are covered
by the partial agreement. While she is not guaranteed to get the most
favorable terms with respect to the unresolved issues, she is guaranteed
that nothing worse than these terms can be unilaterally enforced against
her. That is, any additional compromise from this "most favorable"
benchmark can only be consensual. The unresolved matters would
never be the reason to exit the relationship. Thus, a party can make
incremental concessions, spared from a moment in which an entire large
concession is to be yielded.
The guarantee that the other party cannot freely walk away is
valuable in that it diminishes the ability of the other party to engage in
hold-up games. If the other party is threatening to walk away unless
some terms already agreed upon are changed, the threatened party has
some remedy. True, this remedy is not as potent as full-blown
contractual liability would provide because it only inflicts a partial
burden on the threatening party. Still, this intermediate remedy makes it
less likely that retractions from the precontractual agreement would
occur or that the relationship will completely unravel. And with greater
security in the longevity of the relationship and against the risk of
retraction, any investment made to enhance the value of the relationship
is more likely to bear fruit. Each party has an increased incentive to
invest in the relationship and to rely on the precontractual
understandings .62
62.
For formal proof that incentives to invest under this regime will be optimal,
see Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 43, at 443-49. As the formal proof shows, for
the plaintiff to have optimal incentives to invest, the defendant must be precluded from
extracting any value that arises from this investment. Thus, the definition of the
defendant's most favorable terms must exclude value that came about as a result of the
plaintiff's precontractual reliance investment. See generally Hart & Moore, supra note
33, who demonstrate that the value of precontractual commitments is in enabling the
parties to fine-tune their reliance. In Hart & Moore's model, the precontractual
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Stated differently, we saw that under the proposed gap-filling
regime, the deliberately incomplete contract is decoupled in accordance
with the identity of the enforced-against party. From the perspective of
party A, there are two enforceable contracts, each addressing a different
concern this party might have (the same applies for party B). The first
contract is the one that can be enforced against party A. The fact that
this contract includes gap fillers that are so favorable to her guarantees
that no additional concessions beyond those already made would be
forced on her. This fact gives her the peace of mind to make partial
concessions one step at a time. The second contract is the one that party
A can enforce against party B, if the anticipated further negotiations are
abandoned. The fact that party A has this power to enforce a contract
on the other party is sufficient in providing her with the needed
assurance against opportunistic hold-up by party B. While party A
might prefer to negotiate the remaining terms and not yield right away to
those most favorable to party B, she at least has the option to preclude
party B from abandoning the relied-upon relationship.
E. The Effect of Pro-DefendantGap Fillers on Negotiations
Would the existence of the "double option" affect the ability of the
parties to reach an explicit agreement?
Intuitively, it might be
conjectured that each party would be inclined to act strategically: hold
back or imitate a retraction, so as to trigger the exercise of the option by
the opponent. Thus, a party who is genuinely ready to compromise may
nevertheless engage in hawkish bargaining strategies and even withdraw
from partial understandings, in the hope that her opponent would view
this as a genuine breakdown and exercise his enforcement option, and
thereby concede more favorable terms. If both parties act this way,
bargaining that might otherwise succeed would, in the shadow of prodefendant gap fillers, tend to fail.
It is not clear, however, that a party indeed gains anything by
faking a negotiation breakdown or by hardening her position. First, if
such an incentive were to exist, the other party would recognize it and
would not hurry to concede the pro-defendant terms. Thus, to succeed
in this strategy of inducing the opponent to cave-in, one has to
demonstrate that it is not a fake by making a credible irreversible act of
withdrawal from the bargaining.
This, however, is a dangerous
strategy. A party who is willing to compromise but walks away
strategically in order to get better terms is taking the risk that the
opponent will decide not to exercise her option and not to concede the
agreement is not legally enforceable; however, given the investment that follows the
precontractual agreement, it is against the interest of the parties to retract.
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terms that are most favorable to the retracting party. If the act of
walking away is irreversible, it might undermine the deal altogether. In
other words, the upside for the "strategic" party, that she might get
better terms, is offset by the downside, that she might end up with no
deal at all.
Further, there is no reason to think that the risk that such strategic
bargaining poses is any greater under the proposed pro-defendant default
rules. Even in the absence of the double option, in the traditional
regime that assigns no liability to retractions from agreements to agree,
each party might be tempted to hold back strategically, in the hope that
the other party would concede some of the terms. Indeed, negotiators
are universally known to engage in such bargaining bluffs, in the hope
that their opponents would "surrender." The existence of the option that
their opponents now have, to force a deal, does not change the behavior
of negotiators who are all the more eager to deal under their own
favorable terms. So this "hold-out-to-get-better-terms" strategy has
nothing to do with pro-defendant gap fillers. The fact that each party is
granted a default option to concede does not affect the tendency to
utilize such bargaining techniques. This last remark suggests that the
double-option regime is redundant in those situations in which a party is
actually interested in the deal but is vying for more favorable terms.
This party would, of course, be happy to deal under her most favorable
terms, and a legal rule that subjects her to such a burden is mandating an
option that this party would eagerly give her opponent. The doubleoption regime is constraining, then, only in situations in which a party
prefers to abandon the deal altogether and to retract even from the
version of the deal most favorable to her.
F. Implementation
Can courts identify pro-defendant gap fillers? It might seem that
the judicial task of identifying a party's most favorable terms is more
difficult than identifying reasonable gap fillers, usually evidenced by
"market" terms. But that might not necessarily be so. For one, the
nature of adversarial proceedings is already such that each party
provides evidence favorable to herself. For example, in adjudicating a
missing price, the defendant-seller will likely bring expert testimony
supporting a price in the higher end of the reasonable spectrum. In fact,
it would be easier to apply a pro-defendant gap filler than to try and
figure out from the parties' polarized evidence the proper balance that
would adequately reflect majoritarian terms.
Further, courts can
instruct defendants to designate the term that they favor, and induce
defendants' compliance by threatening that if the designation is
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unreasonable, the court would supply a term.63 Finally, recall that
courts are already accustomed in applying another biased
supplementation regime. Under the doctrine of contra-proferentem,
courts are instructed to interpret an ambiguous term not along its most
reasonable meaning, but rather in a one-sided fashion-least favorable to
the drafter of the term.'
To illustrate how pro-defendant terms can be identified, consider
the celebrated case of Walker v. Keith, the Kentucky decision that ruled
that agreements to agree are unenforceable. 65 Parties entered into a 10year lease of $100 per month with an option to extend that lease for an
additional 10-year term at a rental price "to be agreed upon. ,66 Holding
that the parties' minds have never met on a criterion to determine the
rent, the court refused to fill the gap or to enforce the extension of the
lease. 67 At the trial, however, each party explicitly stated its most
favorable term. The lessor demanded a price reflecting the relatively
high increase in rent locally. The lessee sought to prove price changes
nationally and thereby enjoy the lowest plausible rent adjustment.68
Since both demands were within reason, the court could have given the
lessee the option to extend the lease under the term identified to be
favorable to the lessor. At least as a matter of conceptual logic, the
"biased" supplementation is no less-and arguably better-reflective of
the lessor's incompletely manifested intent than the result of no renewal.
In fact, the logic underlying this decoupled supplementation
approach is already recognized and applied in contract doctrine,
suggesting that implementation is not impossible.
The Second
Restatement, for example, recognizes that when an agreement is
indefinite, it may be possible to provide one remedy but not another.69
It may also be possible to grant a remedy only to one party, not another.
For example, when payment terms are not specified in the sale
agreement, "[t]he contract is too indefinite to support a decree of
specific performance against [the buyer], but [the buyer] may obtain

63.

See, e.g., OntarioDowns, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 786-87.

64.

See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,

supra note 1, § 206; see also

5 CORBIN, supra note 14, § 24.27.
65.
382 S.W.2d at 201.

66.
Id. at 199.
67.
Id. at 201. A minority of courts have decided, in identical circumstances,
to protect the lessee's reliance and to fill in a rental term and enforce the agreement.
See, e.g., Fuller v. Mich. Nat'l Bank, 68 N.W.2d 771, 772 (Mich. 1955); see also
FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, § 3.29, at 218 & nn.5-6. The Code also "rejects in these
instances the formula that an agreement to agree is unenforceable." See U.C.C. § 2-305
cmt. 1 (2003) (internal quotations omitted).
68.
Walker, 382 S.W.2d at 203.
69.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 33(2) cmt. b
(stating that "uncertainty may preclude one remedy without affecting another").
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such a decree if he offers to pay the full price in cash." 7" Since it is
possible to identify a gap filler that is most favorable to the seller, the
contract can be enforced only against the seller.
This is not to say that the problem of identifying a party's most
favorable terms is trivial. Even if the defendant made express proposals
at some point in the negotiations, these prior proposals may have
become stale, no longer representing the best the defendant can hope
for. New information, changed market conditions and subsequent
concessions the defendant made on other issues might all render the
defendant's earlier proposal less favorable to her. In those cases, the
defendant's most favorable terms should be inferred not from her
proposal, but from the relevant circumstances.
Any factor that
materialized prior to the time designated by the parties for resolution of
the open issue is relevant for ascertaining the defendant's most favorable
terms, with the exclusion of the plaintiff's reliance investment. As
explained in Part III.D above, the defendant must be precluded from
extracting the value generated by the plaintiff's precontractual
investment.
These factors suggest that the pro-defendant gap-filling regime may
indeed pose problems of implementation. This might explain, perhaps,
the relative scant application of this regime in practice. But, as the
discussion below will demonstrate, courts have chosen to overlook the
pro-defendant solution even when its implementation was
straightforward.
IV. DOCTRINAL APPLICATIONS

The analysis thus far has studied the desirable properties of a
regime that supplements indefinite agreements with terms that are
favorable to the defendant. Such a regime has been shown to create an
intermediate level of liability, deviating from the traditional all-ornothing approach of the mutual assent doctrine-a regime that reflects
more accurately the intent of parties who deliberately left an agreement
incomplete. This Part turns to examine with more detail whether and
how the proposed regime is already part of, or can be infused into, the
law of indefinite agreements. It shows that the seeds of the proposed
gap-filling regime are already planted in contract doctrine. That is,
courts and commentators recognize both the technique of filling gaps
with terms most favorable to the defendant, and the rationale underlying
this technique, although they do so without embracing the full
implications and the generality of this approach. This Part also shows
that existing doctrines and practices traditionally part of the all-or70.

Id. § 33(2) cmt. b, illus. 2.
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nothing approach can be conceptualized to provide the infrastructure for
pro-defendant gap filling.
When contracts are left deliberately
incomplete with the intent to be further negotiated, such expansion of
the doctrine is desirable.
A.

Cure by Concession

Supplementing incomplete contracts by terms most favorable to the
defendant is a technique already recognized in contract law doctrine.
Under the doctrine of "cure by concession," when the contract is silent
over a material term the indefiniteness is overcome by granting the
plaintiff the option to concede the missing term in accordance with in the
defendant's most favorable arrangement. 7
As Corbin recognizes,
"[w]here the parties intend to contract but defer agreement on certain
essential terms until later, the gap can be cured if one of the parties
72
offers to accept any reasonable proposal that the other may make. ,
Cure by concession is often applied in cases in which the parties
agreed on a price but left the payment terms "to be agreed upon." In
these situations, if the buyer agrees to pay in a manner most favorable to
the seller-full payment in cash and with no delay-then the
indefiniteness is cured." It is not that courts perceive the full payment
in cash as the reasonable term that the parties hypothetically intended, or
would have agreed upon had they continued to negotiate. In fact,
oftentimes it is quite clear that the parties hoped to agree on installment
or credit terms, something less favorable to the seller. Rather, courts
regard the buyer's willingness to make full payment in cash as a waiver
that "obviate[s] any need to come to any agreement as to the manner and
form of payment." 74 Since "there is no longer any way that the
provision may be construed to [the defendant's] detriment," any
resistance to the contract on the ground that it is ambiguous should be
eliminated. 7'
See 1 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 24, § 3.29, at 219.
1 CORBIN, supra note 14, § 4.1, at 532.
73.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 33(2) illus. 2 ("A
agrees to sell and B to buy a specific tract of land for $10,000 .... [and] to lend B the
amount, but the terms of the loan are not stated .... The contract is too indefinite
to . . .[enforce it] against B, but B may ... [enforce it] if he offer[s] to pay the full
price in cash.").
74.
Morris v. Ballard, 16 F.2d 175, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (finding that if the
terms of payment were not agreed upon, the purchaser can enforce the deal if he is ready
to pay the agreed price under such terms as the vendor might impose.); Shull v. Sexton,
390 P.2d 313, 318 (Col. 1964); Matlack v. Arend, 63 A.2d 812, 817 (N.J Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1949) (finding that if the buyer "waives all credit and offers to pay cash, the
defense that the agreement is too indefinite is untenable").
75.
Busching v. Griffin, 542 So. 2d 860, 864 (Miss. 1989). Many courts,
however, reject this view and hold that agreements that leave the terms of payment to be
71.
72.

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Cure by concession can also apply to issues more central to the
agreement than payment terms, such as identification of the subject
matter of the contract or the price. In Ontario Downs, the parties
entered agreement for the sale of 16 acres of land for $50,000, but did
not specify which 16 acres within the seller's 450-acre lot were being
sold. 76 The buyer offered to accept any 16-acre tract that the seller
might designate, but the seller refused. The court held that the parties
viewed the agreement to agree as binding, and that the gap should be
filled in a way favorable to the seller. 77 Not knowing which 16-acre
tract would satisfy this criterion, the court instructed that if the buyer
waived his right of selection and was willing to accept any parcel, then
the seller would be required to designate an "appropriate parcel" that the
buyer would have to accept. If the seller failed to make such a
selection, then the buyer would be entitled to designate a parcel himself.
Under this scheme, the buyer can in effect force the seller to supplement
the contract with a term most favorable to the seller, and the information
as to what term is most favorable to the seller is extracted out of the
seller by the threat that if he fails to designate it appropriately, then he
will have to accept a less favorable term.
There are other situations, however, in which courts can readily
overcome indefiniteness with the aid of pro-defendant gap fillers and yet
refuse to do so. For example, in Wilhelm Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud,
the parties agreed to on a sale of 5000 gallons of motor oil of a
particular brand, leaving the buyer the right to determine which
viscosity type he required. 8 Because there were seven possible types of
motor oil each priced differently, the court refused to hold the retracting
buyer to damages. The court reasoned that in the absence of a
designated single type, the purchase price could not be ascertained, and
thus there was no basis for the computation of damages. 79 The contract
failed for indefiniteness. This was a case, however, in which the court
could easily have applied a pro-defendant default, requiring the buyer to
do that which he was entitled to under the agreement-namely, to
specify the precise oil type. In the absence of an affirmative designation
by the buyer, the court could have computed the damages on the basis of
the type least costly to the buyer.
Another illustration of pro-defendant gap fillers in practice involves
lease contracts that leave the duration of the renewal indefinite. For
example, parties who use standard form leases that provide an extension
agreed upon are fatally defective. See Roberts v. Adams, 330 P.2d 900, 906 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1958); 1 CORBIN, supra note 14, § 4.3, at 579.
13 Cal. Rptr. at 784; see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
76.
13 Cal. Rptr. at 787.
77.
268 N.W. 634, 635 (Minn. 1936).
78.
Id. at 637.
79.
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clause "for
years" occasionally fail to fill in the blank. This might
not be a deliberate case of incompleteness but rather a result of neglect
or haste. Nevertheless, courts facing such indefiniteness have generally
construed these terms "to be for the shortest period for which the lease
could be renewed or extended." 0
This, as one court explains,
guarantees that the landlord will not be held to a longer period than the
agreement stated."
When parties leave the price term to be agreed upon later, the
option to cure the indefiniteness by conceding the other party's most
favorable price is less commonly recognized. Usually, the court would
fill in a price term only if the parties explicitly provided a
"methodology" for determining it, but would hold the agreement fatally
defective otherwise. 82 Alternatively, even in the absence of any explicit
methodology courts occasionally fill in the blank with a fair and
reasonable market term. 8 Other times a plaintiff who prefers a contract
with the conceded price to the no-contract outcome will offer to make
such a concession and to accept a pro-defendant gap filler. In his
landmark decision in Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Remington
Article & Power Co., Inc., Cardozo makes reference to such a
technique:
-

If price and nothing more had been left open for adjustment,
there might be force in the contention that the buyer would be
viewed, in the light of later provisions, as the holder of an
option.... [The buyer] would have the privilege of calling for

delivery in accordance
maximum."

with a price established

as a

Cardozo, however, rejects the application of this approach in his
decision.85 But there are circumstances in which even a price term can
80.

49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 158 (1995).

Similarly, a general

covenant to renew without stating the number of renewals is construed to entitle the
tenant one renewal.
81.
Starr v. Holck, 28 N.W.2d 289, 292-93 (Mich. 1947).
82.
Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc., 417 N.E.2d at 543-44 (proffering a

methodology for determining the price has to be found within the four corners of the
agreement).
83.
See Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Validity and Enforceability of Provision
for Renewal of Lease at Rental to Be Fixed By Subsequent Agreement of the Parties, 58
A.L.R.3D 500, 515-19 (1974).

84.
85.

139 N.E.2d 470, 470 (N.Y. 1923) (citations omitted).
Id. at 471. Commentators raise doubts as to the validity of the outcome in

Sun Printingbased on the same logic developed in this article. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH,
supra note 24, § 3.29, at 220 ("On the court's own reasoning, had the buyer offered to
pay the Canadian supplier's highest price ... there would appear no reason to refuse to
enforce the agreement."). However, many other examples in line with Sun Printing can
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be supplemented by picking a value most favorable to the defendant.
The following Section explores these circumstances.
B.

Agreements with an Explicit Range of Terms

Oftentimes the parties, while failing to specify a definite term such
as price, do specify a range from which they expect to pick out a
definite term in the course of subsequent negotiations. This situation
presents courts with an intermediate form of indefiniteness. There is no
formula or methodology that can yield a certain "resolution of
ambiguity," but there is more than "an inkling that either of the parties
assented" to some figure.86 Since courts are reluctant to split the
difference and name a price in the mid-range, a result more loyal to the
parties' agreement is sometimes achieved by granting each party an
option to concede the other party's most favorable price within the
range. As Corbin explains the law in this situation:
The exact price may be left for future negotiation within a
specified maximum and a specified minimum. In such a case
it may be intended that the buyer shall have a binding option to
buy at the maximum, or the seller shall one to sell at the stated
minimum, or both may have such options.87
Thus, when the parties explicitly state that the price to be agreed
upon "shall not exceed p," courts have overcome the problem of
indefiniteness by granting the buyer an option to buy at the stated
maximum, p. 88 The explicit rationale for this solution is similar to the
one invoked in this Article. A seller's agreement to agree on a price not
exceeding p can be view as containing two separate components: to
continue good faith negotiations over a the price, and to forgo his
prerogative to demand a price greater than p. If the buyer were willing
to pay p, the seller would be considered retracting from the latter
component of this agreement if he refused to accept p. 89 The seller's
be found in adjudication of incomplete lease contracts, where parties leave the rent to be
agreed upon later, and the plaintiff is seeking enforcement under the best possible terms
for the defendant. Knapp, supra note 18, at 698-703 (surveying this line of cases).
Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d at 544.
86.
87.
1 CORBIN, supra note 14, § 2.8, at 138-39.
88.
See, e.g., Denny v. Jacobson, 55 N.W.2d 568 (Iowa. 1952) (stating that
the lease's option to renew was at price to be agreed upon "'not less than Forty-seven

and 50/100 dollars ($47.50) or more than Seventy-seven and 50/100 dollars ($77.50)'"
is enforceable at the maximum rent); see also cases cited in 1 CORBIN, supra note 14, at
578 n.27.
89.
"When a bargained-for term of a renewal provision sets a range within
which negotiations for a rental rate must take place, the lessor may not render the
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own acceptance of the range negates any reasonable grounds for him to
reject the best term within the range.
In cases in which parties agree to agree on a term but fail to specify
an explicit range, the same result of granting each party an option to
concede the other party's favorable term could be obtained if courts
were to supplement the agreement with an implied range. True, this
interpretation of the agreement takes us further from the parties' actual
will, to the domain of implied or hypothetical will. But as one court
explained:
A court may not close its eyes to the truism that a landlord's
proper objective should be and is to obtain the highest rent that
a tenant under all the circumstances can afford to
pay ....

When, therefore, a tenant's option extension clause

in a lease contains a ceiling (implied or constructive in this
instance) upon the rent to be charged for the extended period
and the tenant is willing to pay that ceiling price, the landlord
may not be heard to challenge that option clause otherwise
void for uncertainty. 90
Given that the parties explicitly postponed the negotiation over the
renewal price, it is fictitious to say that the parties reached hypothetical
consent. This is why courts by and large rejected the "reasonable" price
gap fillers, which are so closely linked to the notion of mimicking the
parties' will. But it is less fictitious to presume that the landlord
hypothetically consented not to demand more than the maximal plausible
rent. It may well be that the tenant hoped for a better outcome and
would not be interested in exercising the renewal option under such
terms. But if the tenant is interested and is suing to renew the lease
under the "ceiling" price, is there any good reason to prefer the standard
non-enforcement outcome?

renewal provision unenforceable simply by ... insisting on rent exceeding the
maximum allowed by the contract." See Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Bell Canyon
Shopping Ctr., 13 P.3d 600, 603 (Utah 2000).
90.
Huber v. Ruby, 65 N.Y.S.2d 462, 465 (Gen. Term 1946) (emphasis
added).
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C. Options for Renewal of Lease
One of the main areas in which the doctrine of indefiniteness has
been well tested is a lease contract with a tenant option to renew at
rental to be agreed upon at the time of renewal. While the majority of
courts still view these contracts as indefinite and unenforceable, a
growing trend is to allow the tenant to exercise the option even if the
negotiations over the renewal price fail, by using the fair market price as
gap filler. 9' This solution clearly violates the landlord's immunity,
which he explicitly secured in the contract, from nonconsensual
designation of the rental price. Accordingly, courts have occasionally
considered a policy of allowing the tenant to renew under the landlord's
maximal obtainable price. In such cases, the tenant's exercise price is
sometimes equated with "the highest rent which a responsible bidder is
apt to offer."92
To be sure, this solution is not without difficulty. It suggests that
an option to renew under a price to be agreed upon would automatically
become an option to renew under the landlord's maximal price. But if
the parties already thought about granting the tenant an option (to
renew), doesn't their reluctance to state a renewal price indicate that
they did not seek to grant the tenant a one-sided power to effectuate
renewal? Indeed, the pro-defendant supplementation of the option
strains the language of the explicit agreement. But it surely does less of
injustice to the parties' original intent than the polar solutions usually
reached of either average market price or invalidation of the option
altogether. While the landlord did not grant the tenant an explicit option
to renew at the maximal price, it is unreasonable for him to defend by
saying that he did not intend to be bound to such an interpretation.
One way the maximal price can be inferred by a court is by looking
at other bids the landlord received from potential tenants, and equating
the renewal price to the highest rentable value.93 Like a right of first
refusal, the price is set at the highest value the landlord is offered
elsewhere. True, the proposed gap-filling standard is more than an
"implied" right of first refusal. Here, the tenant can compel the
transaction and does not have to wait for the landlord to initiate one.
But both an implied right of first refusal and an option to concede the

See Feld, supra note 83, § 2[a], at 503-06.
91.
92.
See, e.g., Moolenaar v. Co-Build Cos., 354 F. Supp. 980, 984 (D.V.I.
1993) (restricting this formula to the highest value under the original zoning
restrictions).
93.
Diettrich v. J.J. Newberry Co., 19 P.2d 115, 117 (Wash. 1933); DiMaria
v. Michaels, 455 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877 (App. Div. 1982).
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maximal price address the problem of indefiniteness by reference to the
highest "market value of the premises at the time of renewal."'
Another way to implement the "highest-value" formula is for the
court to pick the valuation assessed by the landlord's expert witness.95
In many of these suits, the tenant, while asking the court to supplement
the deal with a fair or reasonable rental price, provides some testimony
concerning the market price, usually on the lower end of the market
distribution. The landlord, trying to show that there does not exist one
"market price" and that the agreement is thus indefinite, provides
testimony concerning the high end of the market distribution. The fact
that both the landlord's and the tenant's information is valid does not
necessitate an outcome of no enforcement. Rather, and consistent with
the courts' stated purpose to protect the tenant's bargain, the tenant
should be entitled to concede the landlord's price.
These intermediate solutions, of enforcing an agreement to agree
while supplementing it with terms more favorable to the enforcedagainst party, are the exception. More often courts restrict their
attention to "all-or-nothing" solutions. Even when a tenant is willing to
pay the maximal rent, "as much as any other responsible party would
pay," the court may refuse to enforce the renewal option.9 But often
the underlying reason for the rejection of this supplementation formula
is not a rejection of the pro-defendant gap-filling logic, but rather a
recognition that the highest price alone does not exhaust the defendant's
concern. For example, a landlord may be unhappy even with the
highest market price in light of the conduct of the tenant. In these
situations, the correct implementation of a pro-defendant gap filler
would require the impractical judicial task to ascertain such non-price
concerns, which perhaps explains some of the judicial resistance to the
rule.
V.

CONCLUSION

Building on an assortment of existing doctrines and gap-filling
practices, and seeking justification both on conceptual and economic
grounds, this Article has developed a pro-defendant standard of gap
filling in incomplete contracts, potentially contributing to the general
theory of default rules in contract law.

94.

Diettrich, 19 P.2d at 117; 49 Am. JUR.2D Landlord and Tenant § 156, at

165 & n.30 (citing Arnot v. Alexander, 44 Mo. App. 25, 28 (1869) (holding that the
view that a fair rentable value is "different and may be 'something more' that its full or

highest rentable market value" is erroneous)).
95.

Lassiter v. Kaufman, 581 So. 2d 147, 148 (Fla. 1991).

96.

Diettrich, 19 P.2d at 115.
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There are several ways to think about the underpinnings of the
proposed approach. One way, which I explored in a previous essay, is
to think of contractual liability as arising, not from consensus between
the parties, but from each party's separate and unilateral representation
of serious intent to be bound. 91 Under this approach, a party cannot
freely retract from the terms and proposals she indicated would be
acceptable to her. If the basis of liability is divorced from consensus,
each party could be accountable for a different unilateral representation.
And when a party's unilateral representation is incomplete, this ground
of liability is consistent only with supplementation that is favorable to
the liable party since it is only to such terms that her intent to be bound
can be safely presumed.
The pro-defendant gap-filling approach can also be viewed as a
beginning of a challenge to the general idea of reasonable, or mid-range,
resolutions of disputes in contract law. Much of the law of remedies,
for example, is aimed at reaching reasonable, unbiased assessments of
damages, often as a prerequisite to granting any remedy at all. For
example, expectation damages are awarded only if the assessment of lost
Applying the logic
profits can be made reasonably accurately.9"
developed in this Article, this all-or-nothing approach-either damages
are proven with certainty, or no damages will be recovered-can be
questioned. In the context of damages, even if the plaintiff failed to
prove the lost expectation with sufficient certainty, the default outcome
should not be a complete bar against recovery of expectation damages.
Instead, the plaintiff should be entitled to a recovery of such damages as
prescribed by the formula most favorable to the defendant.9 While this
remedial burden may fail to accurately reflect the plaintiff's true loss, it
is more accurate than the denial of expectation damages altogether and it
guarantees that the defendant is not held accountable for more than the
loss he caused.
The analysis in this paper focused on conceptual and economic
justifications for the pro-defendant default rules. A more complete
inquiry into the merits of this approach would have to address additional
aspects. For example, it would have to explore in greater depth
bargaining practices and the extent to which they are consistent with the
fundamental no-going-back norm underlying the proposed regime.
Additionally, the inquiry can extend to other areas of legal doctrine in
which default rule theory proved useful, and explore the value of gap
filling in the manner most favorable to the liable parties.

97.

See Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis

for Contractual Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1829 (2004).
98.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, §§ 33(2), 35(2).

99.

See Wilhelm, 268 N.W. at 637.

